The Short Ladder | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 2

The Grammar of Bihar · Part 2 of 8

Land, inheritance and the great sorting that decides who leaves Bihar and who stays to fight over what remains.


Bihar Economy

A ridge of earth

Every Bihari knows some version of this story. A man owns a few bighas of good land on the Gangetic plain, enough to feed his family and marry off his daughters with dignity. He has three sons. When he dies, the land is divided, and each son receives a third. Each son has sons of his own, and the land is divided again. Somewhere in the third generation, the inheritance stops being a farm and becomes a quarrel.

By then the fields are strips. They are separated by thin ridges of earth that a man can step across, and that a man can also, at night, move by the width of a foot. A cousin’s buffalo grazes where it should not. A brother’s tubewell draws water that both claim. The paperwork, if it exists, was last updated by a clerk two generations ago. Everyone knows exactly where the boundary is, and no two people agree.

Outsiders tend to treat such disputes as rural colour, the kind of thing that happens in villages everywhere. In Bihar, they are something more. They are the place where the state’s economy, its history, its violence and its politics all meet, on a ridge of earth too narrow to stand on.


The arithmetic of inheritance

The numbers behind the story are stark. The average farm in Bihar now covers about 0.39 hectares, a little more than half a football pitch. In Punjab the figure is 3.62 hectares, more than nine times larger. Ninety-one per cent of Bihar’s landholdings are marginal, under one hectare, against about 68 per cent nationally. And the holdings are still shrinking: the average operated area fell from 0.43 hectares in 2005-06 to 0.39 a decade later.

The people dividing that land keep multiplying. The 2011 Census counted 10.41 crore Biharis; the state’s caste survey of 2023 counted 13.07 crore. Agriculture still employs more than half of Bihar’s workforce, far above the national share. The same survey found that a third of Bihar’s 2.97 crore families live on ₹6,000 a month or less, about ₹200 a day. More than 95 per cent of Biharis do not own a motorised vehicle of any kind.

Put those figures together and the result is the lowest per capita income of any Indian state. In 2024-25 the average Bihari earned about ₹69,000, roughly a third of the national figure, which is about what the average Indian earned more than a decade ago. By one estimate, Bihar’s income per head stood at about two-thirds of India’s average in 1950. It has been sliding ever since. Bihar did not start at the bottom. It was pushed there, and understanding how is the first step to understanding everything that follows.


Every other door, closed

The story begins in 1793, when the East India Company’s Permanent Settlement fixed land revenue in Bengal and Bihar and installed zamindars as intermediaries between the peasant and the state. The zamindar collected rent, kept a share and answered to almost no one below him. For a century and a half, the peasant of Bihar experienced the state chiefly as someone else’s collector.

Independence promised to end this, and Bihar moved early. Its Land Reforms Act of 1950 set out to abolish zamindari. The Maharaja of Darbhanga and other landlords challenged it, and in March 1951 the Patna High Court struck the law down as discriminatory. It was one of the cases that pushed Parliament to pass the Constitution’s very first amendment, which created the Ninth Schedule to shield land-reform laws from such challenges. Zamindari was abolished on paper. On the ground, ceilings on landholding were evaded through benami transfers and family partitions, and the land that should have reached the tiller mostly stayed where it was.

The last serious attempt came in 2006, when the new Nitish Kumar government appointed D. Bandyopadhyay, the administrator behind West Bengal’s Operation Barga, to head a land reforms commission. His report, submitted in April 2008, recommended a law to protect sharecroppers, an enforced ceiling on holdings and computerised land records. It argued that once the ceiling was enforced, every landless family in the state could receive a small plot. A lobby of landowning castes rose against it, and the government backed away, assuring the public there would be no new law for sharecroppers. The report has been gathering dust ever since.

Industry, the other way out of the fields, was closed off as well. For four decades after Independence, the Centre’s freight equalisation policy subsidised the transport of coal and steel so that a factory in Maharashtra or Tamil Nadu paid roughly what a factory beside the mines did. Bihar’s natural advantage, its mineral wealth, was neutralised, and capital settled on the coasts. Then, in 2000, the state was divided. The mines, the steel towns and most of the industry went to the new state of Jharkhand. What remained was the plain: fertile, crowded, flooded in the north and parched in the south. Around three-quarters of north Bihar’s people live under the threat of floods.

Take stock of what that history leaves. No redistribution of land. No industry to absorb the young. A state that arrived as a tax collector and left as a rumour. When every other door has been closed, the field becomes the only ladder, and a ladder that short cannot hold everyone who needs to climb it.


What people kill for

A ladder that short is defended with everything a family has. Bihar’s overall murder rate is not exceptional by Indian standards. What is exceptional is what people kill over. In 2021, of the 1,081 murders in Bihar that police attributed to disputes, 635, or 59 per cent, were over land. In 2019, Bihar alone accounted for nearly 45 per cent of all the deaths and serious injuries in India caused by land and property disputes. In July 2025, the state’s police chief told reporters plainly that land and property were behind most of the killings. Courts offer little relief: one Bihar court recently settled a land dispute that had been pending for 108 years.

The reason land is fought over so fiercely is that it is never only land. A man with land is someone. He can marry his daughters into good families, borrow against his harvest, command labour at sowing time and hold his head up in the village panchayat. A man without land is a labourer on someone else’s field, and in Bihar that has always meant being someone else’s dependant. To lose a strip of land to a cousin is to lose a rung of standing, and standing, as we shall see, is the one thing a Bihari cannot afford to lose.

Because land and caste have long mapped onto each other in Bihar, the fight over land became, for two decades, a fight between castes. From the 1970s, Naxalite groups organised landless labourers, most of them Dalits and lower backward castes, to demand land and fair wages. Landowners answered with private armies; the first, the Kisan Suraksha Samiti, appeared in 1978, and more than a dozen followed. The most notorious, the Ranvir Sena, was formed by Bhumihar landowners in 1994. In 1992, Maoists killed 37 upper-caste men at Bara. In December 1997, the Ranvir Sena killed 58 Dalits at Laxmanpur Bathe, people who had nothing to do with Bara except their caste. Between 1995 and 2000 the Sena carried out 30 massacres and killed 321 people. Human Rights Watch documented local officials with caste ties who looked the other way, or helped.

The massacres ended after 2000, as the Naxalite movement weakened under police pressure. The dispute did not end. It moved from the fields into the courts, the police stations and, above all, into politics. The war over the ladder had taught Bihar a lesson that would outlast it: when the state cannot settle who owns what, people settle it themselves, and they settle it as groups.


The great sorting

There is another way off a short ladder: step off it altogether. The economist Albert Hirschman observed that people facing decline in any community have three options. They can leave, they can protest, or they can stay and endure. Bihar has been running that sorting experiment on itself for generations, and the results shape its politics as much as anything that happens inside the state.

By the government’s own count, about 46 lakh Biharis work in other states and another 2.17 lakh abroad, and the real figure is almost certainly higher, since a household survey misses those who have moved their families with them. They drive autos in Delhi, run looms in Surat, harvest wheat in Punjab, lay bricks in Bengaluru and pour concrete in the Gulf. Every year, before Chhath, the trains out of Delhi and Mumbai are packed beyond capacity as they come home for a few days, and then leave again.

Who leaves is not random. Leaving takes courage, but it also takes capital: the fare, the contact in the city, the education that turns a migrant into a professional rather than a labourer. The caste survey shows the pattern clearly. Upper castes make up about 15.5 per cent of Bihar’s population, but around 40 per cent of the Biharis working abroad. The poorest go too, but they go nearer, for less, and they come back more often. The most mobile and best-equipped Biharis are, disproportionately, the ones who have gone the furthest.

This is migration’s quiet political effect, and it cuts against the usual story. Migration is celebrated as a safety valve, and so it is: remittances keep millions of households afloat. But a safety valve also keeps a system from bursting. The people best placed to demand that Bihar change are the people most likely to be building their lives somewhere else. Many of them do not even vote in Bihar’s elections; analysts routinely attribute part of the gap between women’s and men’s turnout to absent men. Exit relieves the pressure, and in doing so it removes the people most likely to use their voice.


The ones who stay

Those who stay are not simply those who could not leave. Some are the eldest sons who must look after ageing parents. Some hold enough land to make leaving costly, or enough local standing to make it unthinkable. Some are women, whose mobility the family controls. Some have tried the city and come back. What they share is that their lives will be decided here, within the narrow economy of the plain, and that the fight for what remains is now their fight.

For them, the remaining rungs of the ladder are mostly political. A government job, the most coveted prize in the state, depends on examinations, quotas and, many believe, on knowing someone. A contract for a road or a school building depends on the local MLA. A police complaint against a powerful neighbour goes nowhere without a phone call from the right person. Even the post of mukhiya, head of a village council, carries enough power over local funds and disputes that when Bihar reserved half these posts for women in 2006, turnout in the panchayat polls reportedly exceeded turnout in assembly and parliamentary elections.

This is why politics in Bihar is not a spectator sport. For those who stayed, it is the main arena left in which a family can rise or fall. And because what is being contested is scarce, the contest turns inward, against the people closest to hand: the cousin across the ridge, the neighbouring caste, the rival faction within one’s own. Hirschman’s “voice” was meant to describe citizens pressing a declining institution to improve. In Bihar, voice is more often a family or a caste pressing its claim against another, using the state as the prize rather than the referee.


More than a strip of land

Go back to the three brothers and their ridge of earth. An economist would say they are fighting over a resource, and that is true as far as it goes. Two kathas of land are worth something. But watch the quarrel closely and the economics soon stops explaining it. Brothers who could each earn more by leasing their strips together spend years and savings in court. Families who could settle for a fair price would rather lose everything than be seen to give way. Men who have not farmed in a decade still fight over fields they will never till.

What they are defending is not only land. It is the right to be someone in the only world they have left, in front of the only audience whose judgment matters: the family, the village, the caste. That hunger is older than any election, and it does not begin in a field. It begins at home, in a joint family where respect is handed out by birth, rationed by an elder, and fought over long before anyone learns the word politics.


Author’s Note: This article was conceptualized, researched, and outlined by the author, with generative AI tools utilized to assist in drafting and refining the prose.

References


Articles in this series:

    1. The Puzzle and the Argument | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 1
    2. The Short Ladder | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 2
    3. The Attention Economy | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 3
    4. The Shelters | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 4
    5. The Moral Ledger | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 5
    6. Two Registers | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 6
    7. Collateral, Conscience and Kingmakers | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 7
    8. The Lock | The Grammar of Bihar, Part 8

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